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conunents.1.  Introduction
This paper has two goals.  On the positive  side, to explain  observed  trade and labor market
policies in developing  countries.  On the normative  side, to address an institution  design question;
namely,  how to structure  coalditionality  clauses  relating  to these  policies  in aid or loan programs  from
multi-lateral  organizations  like the World Bank. To achieve  these goals. the paper studies  the joint
determination  of product and labor market distortions.  Labor market policies are indeed natural
substitutes  or complements  (depending  on the instrunents)  of product  market  policies. Moreover,  both
policies  often have  the same  political  determinants.
The  joint analysis  of endogenous  product  and  labor  market  distortions  is  particularly  relevant  for
developing  countries. Nowhere  is the link between  these  distortions  more  obvious  than  in the resistance
of labor unions to trade liberalization. Attempts  to reduce  or eliminate  trade barriers in developing
countries  have  often led to strikes, demonstrations  and even riots by organized  labor.  The downward
rigidity of wages in formerly  protected  sectors, in tum, has been pointed out as a major source of
recidivism. More generally,  a large number  of researchers  and practitioners  believe  that not taclding
product  and labor market  distortions  simultaneously  is a recipe  for reform  failure.
Concerns  about  competitiveness  in industrial  countries  have  also resulted  in a link  between  trade
and labor market  policies,  although  with an unexpected  twist.  In the aftermath  of GAIT's Uruguay
round,  which  should  lead  to a significant  liberalization  of world  trade,  the enforcement  of labor  standards
in developing  countries  is seen  by mary as a safeguard  against  unfair  competition.  In this  spirit, the U.S.
recently  approved  legislation  requiring  its Executive  Directors  in multi-lateral  orgizations like  the  World
Bank  to make  the observance  of workers' rights, including  the right  to form labor unions,  a condition
of lending.
In between  those  who  would  like to push  developing  countries  to deregulate  their  labor  markets
and  those  who  would  rather  encourage  them  to guarantee  workers  rights,  some  others  see a positive  role
1for 'social pacts" between  capital  and labor.  They  usually  point to the Pacto Solidaridad  as one of the
key ingredients  in the success  of Mexico's  structural  reform  and  trade liberalization.  However,  the merits
and demerits  of these  pacts  are controversial  too. Although  social  welfare  would  be higher  if capital  and
labor cooperated  to reduce  social  tensions,  this cooperation  could  actually  be a form of collusion  at the
expense  of those sectors  or groups  not represented  in the social  pact.
Our method  of analysis  relies  on  the common  agency  model  pioneered  by Bernheim  and  Whinston
(1986),  and applied  to trade policy  by Grossman  and Helpman  (1994). In this model, the government
is the agent who sets economic  policy.  Various interest groups act as principals and confront  the
government  with  contribution  schedules,  namely  with  functions  mapping  the economic  policy  into actions
valued  by the government. These  actions  admnit  several alternative  interpretations:  they can be bribes,
campaign  contributions,  or even support demonstrations. Two things are essential.  First, that the
govermment  values the actions  more than what they cost to the lobbies. Second,  the timing: first the
lobbies  simultaneously  comnmit  to contribution  schedules;  next, the goverunent, having  observed  these
schedules,  sets economic  policy. The interest groups  thus play Nash against  each other, but take into
account  the influence  of their choices  on the govermment.
Grossman  and Helpman  (1994)  apply  this approach  to a small open economy  with many  sectors.
They only study trade policy.  The principals are the owners  of fixed factors in each sector, while
consumers  are not organized  in lobbies.  By contrast, our paper studies a small (developing)  open
economy  with only  two sectors:  manufactring and agriculture,  or better, a formal  and organized  sector,
and an informal  sector. The govenmment  controls  two policy  instruments:  a tariff and a minimum  wage.
Both po!icies only affect  the manufacturing  sector.  There are two organized  interest groups: capital
owners, and union members.  They too are only present in the manufachtring  sector.  Factors of
production  in agriculture  (the informal  sector) are not organized  in a political lobby.  Thus, unlike
Grossman  and Helpman  (1994)  our paper focuses  on how  different  factors  in the same sector  lobby  the
2govcrnment  for distortionary  policies  that, on the one hand  create rents (the  tariff),  and on the other hand
determine  the distribution  of these rents (the minimum  wage.)
We obtain  several  results. First, a set of positive  results, concerning  the econornic  and political
determinants  of trade  and labor market  policies. Despite  the conflict  of interest  on labor  market  policies,
there is complementarity  between  the two policy  instruments:  in equilibrium,  labor  and product  market
distortions  always  move in the same direction  in response  to exogenous  changes  in any of the relevant
economic  and political  parameters. The economic  parameters  are those determining  the extent of the
deadweight  losses resulting  from distortions. The political parameters  are related to the size of the
interest  groups  and to the value  the government  attaches  to their contributions.  In the general  case, the
equilibrium  level of distortions is not modified  if capital owners and unionized  workers decide to
cooperate. However, social pacts may reduce  the amount of resources  wasted in lobbying. This is
because  by playing  Nash, interest groups  are to some extent  lobbying  against  each other (particularly,
regarding  the minimum  wage), an inefficiency  that can be avoided  through  cooperation.
Second,  we obtain a set of normative  results, concerning  the optimal  design of conditionality
clauses  by a multi-lateral  agency. Under  plausible  assumptions,  the multi-lateral  agency  should  target
product  market  distortions,  but not labor  market  distortions. That is, labor  market  distortions  are second
best: they are the optimal  response  to the product  market distortions. Thus, if a conditionality  clause
succeeds  in removing  or reducing  a tariff, the labor  market  policy  will  endogenously  adjust  and also  move
in the right direction. This result follows  from a set of assunptions  implying  that the economic  agents
not organized  in a political  lobby (usually  workers  in the informal  sector)  are hanned  by trade policy  but
not by the labor market  policy. If this feature  of the model  is removed,  then the optimal  conditionality
clause  should  target  both  product  and labor  market  distortions,  but the optimal  targeting  of labor  markets
is generally  ambiguous  and depends on features of the economy  that might be hard to assess.  The
optimal  targeting  of commercial  policy,  on the other  hand, should  always  be in favor  of free trade. This
3result thus provides  support  for the existing  practice  of the World Bank,  which is characterized  by a
strong  focus  on trade liberalization,  but  little  emphasis  on labor  market  refornis. When  economic  policies
depend  on which  party is in office, conditionality  may  also affect  product  and labor narket  distortions
through  election  outcomes. Because  transfers  from abroad are higher the lower are trade barriers,
conditionality  biases  the choice  of rational  voters  in favor  of the more  free trade party.
The papei is organized  as follows. Section  2 lays out  the  model  summarized  above. The welfare
effects  of economic  policies  are described  in section  3.  The equilibrium  is characterized  in section  4,
while  section  5 discusses  its comparative  statics  properties  in response  to changes  in observable  features
of the economy. Section  6 evaluates  the economic  and political  consequences  of a social  pact between
capital  owners  and  union  members. The optimal  design  of conditionality  clauses  is discussed  in section
7.  Section  8 extends  the model  to an electoral  competition  between  left-wing  and right-wing  politicians,
and sector 9 contains  some  concluding  remarks.
2.  The Model
Consider  an economy  with  two sectors,  which  will  be identified  as agriculture  and  manufacturing
for siniplicity.  The nature  of the goods  produced  by  these  two sectors  has in fact little  importance.  Their
relevant  feature is whether  individuals  in these sectors  are organized  in interest  groups  or not.  It is
assumed  that  workers  in agriculture  undertake  no collective  action,  while  both  workers  and capital  owners
in manufacturing  do.  Therefore,  the sectoral  distinction  accounts  here for institutional  heterogeneity.
The hypothesis  that  different  sectors  have  different  institutions  is pervasive  in development  economics.
Depending  on the authors,  the sectors  are labelled  as 'modem" and 'traditional", "urban"  and "rural",
or 'formal" and "informal".  Whatever  the chosen  classification,  it is relatively  easy  to pinpoint  features
of the production  process  (such  as spatial  agglomeration,  or the number  of individuals  ins Ived)  which
make it easier  to overcome  the obstacles  to collective  action  in one of the sectors  than in the other.
4Total  population  is normalized  to one. A fraction  a1K of the individuals  own  the capital  used in'
manufacturing  and do not need to work.  as wage eaners to make a living.  These individuals  are
organized  in a producers'  association. A fraction  aU of the individuals  are manufacturing  workers,
organized in a trade union.  Finally, the remaining I - aK-  aU individuals  work in agriculture and have
no organization  to represent  them.
All  individuals  have  the same  preferences  over consumption  goods, represented  by the following
objective  function:
ui =ai  + U(C')  (1)
where  ui is the utility  level  of individual  i, ai is his or her consumption  of the agricultural  good, and ce
is his or her consunption  of the manufactured  good. The function U(.) is increasing  and concave
Utility  is maximized  subject  to the budget  constraint:
Ti 2 al +  pci  (2)
where  li is the net income  of individual  i, to be defined  below,  and  p is the  domestic  relative  price  of the
manufactured  good. The price  of the agricultural  good  is normalized  to unity. Given  the specification
chosen  for the utility  function  ui, it follows  that  consumption  of the manufactured  good  does  not  depend
on  income:
cI =C(p) foralli  ,  C  p<0  (3)
where  a subscript  denotes  a derivative.
5Agricultural  goods  are produced  with  labor only. Wages  in agriculture  are normalized  to unity.
Manufactured  goods  are produced  with capital  K and labor L, according  to a concave  function  F(K,L).
Profit  maximization  by finns implies  that  for a given  capital  stock,  employment  in manufacturing  depends
on the domestic  price p of the manufactured  good  and on the wage  w paid  to the workers  in this sector:
FL(K,L) - w/p  (4)
Since total population  was normalized  to one, L (<  AU) represents  the fraction  of total population
actually  employed  in manufacturing.
The government  has two policy  instruments:  import  tariffs, p -p*, where  p* is the international
price of manufacturing  goods; and minimnum  wages  in the manufacturing  sector, w.  Since wages  in
agriculture  are unity, the wage  differential  w - 1 measures  the government  intervention  in the labor
market. For simplicity,  we assume  that the only government  revenues  are the proceeds  T of import
tariffs  on manufactured  goods:  1
T *(p-p)[C(p)  -F(K,L)]  (5)
Tariff  revenue  is distributed  to individuals  belonging  to different  groups  according  to exogenous  weights.
Specifically,  the government  transfer  to an individual  who  belongs  to group  j is tfJ T, with 4i 2  0 and
such  that:
acK4pK  + aU+,U  + (1  -ax -U) a  -1  (6)
1  1The  results  would  be unchanged  if there  was an export  subsidy,  rather than  an import  tariff, on
manufactured  goods. In this case, T would  be negative.
6Two particular  cases  will be highlighted  in what  follows. The case where  4,  =  1 for all j corresponds
to the standard  international  trade model, where  tariff revenues  are assumed  to be distributed  evenly
across the population. The case where OA = 0 and OK =  -U  =  1/(aK + cU) may fit better a set up
in which  only  the individuals  who  are organized  in interest  groups  benefit  from redistribution.
Individuals  belonging  to different  groups  differ  in their  net income,  which  includes  their  primary
factor earnings,  plus the government  transfer,  if any, and (possibly)  minus  a voluntary  contribution  to
the government  to influence  its economic  policies.
Since  wages  in agriculture  are normalized  to one, the income  of an individual  working  in this
sector  is:
-A  a I +4AT(p,L)  (7A)
By assumption,  agricultural  workers do not make any contributions  to influence  economic  policy
outcomes.
Capital  owners  in the manufacturing  sector  earn  profits in addition  to the transfer  OK  T.  They
pay contributions  XK to the government,  contingent  on the chosen  economic  policies: XK  is a schedule
mapping  every  pair (p,w) into  a contribution  level. Under  these  assumptions,  the net individual  income
of a capital  owner  is:
pF(K,L) -wL + eT(p,L)  - -K(p.w  )  (7K)
Finally, the expected  income  of workers  who are organized  in unions  depends  on how the
minimum  wage  w affects  employment  L in manufacturing.  The higher is w, the lower  is employment
in manufacturing  and,  consequently,  the higher  is the probability  for a union  member  to end up working
7in agriculture. 2 The expected  wage of a union member  is a weighted  average  of the wages  in the two
sectors, w and 1, with weights  L/&U  and (aU - L)/aU respectively. Therefore,  his or her expected
income  is:
lumI  (w -1)L  + UT(p.L)  - )Y(Pw)  (MU)
where XU  are contributions  paid by trade unions  to the government.  These contributions  are treated in
the same way as those by capital owners. Because of risk neutrality, unionized workers are only
concerned  about  their expected  net income  (see  Oswald,  1985),  plus  naturally  the consumption  distortions
resulting  from govermnent  policies.
The government  cares  about  aggregate  well-being,  but  also about  the support  it gets from interest
groups. Its objective  function  V0 can thus be written  as:
VI(p,w)  w3p[K(P.w)  + XU(p,w)]  +  O(p,w) - Ar(P,w)  - XU(P,w)l  (8)
where B >  1 is the weight  the government  attaches  to the support  it gets from organized  groups, and
O(p,w)  is the aggregate  welfare  level  that could  be attained  in the absence  of any political  contributions:
CI(p,w)  . CEKVK(p,W)  +  jLUVU(p,W)  + (l-__U)VA(p,w)  (9)
2  Throughout  the paper  we assume  that in equilibriumn  L <  cxU.
8In cquation  (9), VJ represents  the gross indirect  utility of an individual  belonging  to group J, i.e. the
utility  level  that would  be attained,  given the government  policies,  if he or she did not make any political
contribution  to the government. Note that  0 would  be the objective  function  of the social planner in the
Pigouvian  approach  to economic  policy. The second  term in brackets  in (8) is the net aggregate  welfare
level, obtained  by subtracting  political  contributions  from the gross  welfare level 0.3
Since  B >  1, the government  values  the contributions  more  that what they  cost the lobbies. By
assumption,  the government  values  all contributions  the same, no matter  whether  they come  from capital
owners  or from unionized  workers  (i.e. there is no class bias). The case  of ideological  governments  is
discussed  in section  8 below.
Individuals  maximize  their  utility  for a given  contribution  and a given  policy,  while contributions
are decided  by the corresponding  interest  group.  The interaction  between  the interest groups and the
government  has the structure of a menu auction problem, like the one analyzed by Bernheim  and
Whinston  (1986)  or, in a context  more  similar  to ours, by Grossman  and Helpman  (1994). These  authors
show  that the equilibrium  of the endogenous  policy  game is the policy  (p,w) which maximizes  both the
objective  function  of the government  and those  of each lobby.
3.  The Welfare Effects of the Policies
To understand  the properties  of the model, we first discuss  the welfare effects  of product  and
labor  market  distortions  on individuals  belonging  to each group. There  are direct welfare  effects,  to fte
extent  that changes  in p and w modify  the net income  of these individuals,  as well as the  consumption
distortions  they face. But  there  are indirect  effects  too, because  employment  L in manufacturing  depends
on the real wage w/p.  The labor demand curve represented  by (4) implies that L can be written as
3  This simple  interpretation  of equations  (8) and (9) is made  possible  by the linearity  of preferences
in the agricultural  good.
9L(p,w), with Lp >  0 and Lw <  0, while  physical  output  F(K,L)  is a function  Y (p,w), with Yp > 0
and Yw < 0.  Similarly,  the definition  of tariff revenue  in (5) allows  writing  T as a function  T(p,w),
with Tp 2  O  and Tw 2  0.4
Taking these indirect effects into account, the envelope theorem  implies, in the case of
agricultural  workers:
VA  rcOATp  - C>0 V;  $ATp~C  ~  (IOA)
VA  A  T  a O
At free trade  (p = p*), T,  = O, so hat  VpA <  O  and  V  A  0  O. If agricultural  workers  receive
no transfers  from  the government  (  = 0), their indirect  utility  always  decreases  with  protection  (Vp  A
<  0) but is not affected  by wage differentials  (VwA = 0).  If, on the contrary,  tariff revenues  are
distributed  evenly  to the population  (OA  = 1), then agricultural  workers  are still harmed  by protection,
but  they  benefit  from higher  wages  in manufacturing.  The  beneficial  effect  of higher  wages  comes  form
the  resulting  drop in the domestic supply of manufactured  goods, which expands imports and,
consequently,  tariff revenues. In a more general  model,  with  decreasing  marginal  productivity  of labor
in agriculture,  this beneficial  effect  should  be weighted  against  the reduction  in agricultural  wages  that
would  result  from a dimnished labor  demand  in manufacturing.
4 Equations  (4and(5)  imply  T  = C - Y + (p - p*)(C - YO)  and  Tw =(p  - p*)(wIp)L  with
Y  =  - (w/p) 2Lw. We inplicitly  assume  that  protection  -s  not so  high  to be on the "wrong' side
ofthe Laffer  curve.
10In the case of capital  owners,  the envelope  theorem  implies:
CKY Vp gK  +KP-  O
(10K)
L  +  oT  > O
Since Y/aK > 0, when tariff revenues  are distributed  evenly  to the population  (OK  = qbA  =  1), capital
owners suffer less from increased  protection than agricultural  workers.  The gap in welfare effects
between  both groups  is even larger if agricultural  workers  do not receive  any transfer  (,K  >  OA  = 0).
At free trade (p = p*), Tp = Tw = 0, and capitalists  benefit  from protection  and are harmed  by higher
minimum  wages,  as expected. These results  hold when  tariffs  are positive,  provided  that capital  owners
represent  a narrow  group (a  K small),  or that p is sufficiently  close to p*.
With regard to unionized  workers, their indirect  utility  function  is such that:
VU.  (w-1)Lp +  4UTp  O
(IOU)
TU  L+(w-l)Lw  > VW  S  +(  -)  + 4UTt,  o 
At free trade (p = p*), Tp = Tw = 0.  So, union  members  can either benefit  or suffer from protection
depending  on whether  the induced increase  in employment  exceeds  or falls short of the consumption
distortion. The benefits  from  protection  are greater  the higher  is the minimum  wage. In any event,  when
manufacturing  wages are above their agricultural  counterparts,  unionized  workers suffer less from
increased  protection  than agricultural  workers, and they  can benefit from protection  when the wage  gap
11w - 1 is large  and union  membership  aU is small. Moreover,  starting  at free trade (p = p*), union
members benefit from wage increases  up  to  the point where the  elasticity of labor demand in
manufacturing,  - - Lw w/IL,  is smaller  than unity. The gap between  V  U and V  A is amplified
if agricultural  workers  do not receive  any transfer  from the govermment  (4 U >  OA = 0).  The same
happens  to the gap  between  vpU and V  pA
Thus, as expected,  starting  from a policy of free trade and no minimum  wage, agriculture  is
hanned  by protection,  and capitalists  in manufacturing  are the primary  beneficiaries  of protection,  even
though workers  can benefit  too if minimum  wages  are high. Moreover,  union  members  benefit  from
higher minimum  wages in manufacturing  while capitalists  are harmed by them.  Adding revenue
distribution  changes  these simple  and intuitive  results somewhat. Since  union members  and capital
owners  are the groups  that actively  lobby, it is important  to stress that their economic  interests  are
opposite  with regard to the minimum  wage policy, while  they tend to be similar with regard  to protection.
This plausible  feature  of the model is reflected  in the properties  of the equilibrium  described  in the
remainder  of the paper.
4.  Characterizing  the Equilibrium
In this section  we characterize  the equilibrium  policies  and the equilibrium  contributions.  First
of all, equilibrium  policies  must be optimal  for the government  and for the interest  groups,  given the
equilibrium  contributions  (see  Bemheim  and  Whinston,  1986,  and  Grossman  and  HelpmM,  1994). Thus,
in equilibrium,  interest  groups  make contributions  up to the point where the gain from the resulting
change  in economic  policies  is exactly  offset  by the marginal  cost of the contributions5
We only consider  differentiable  contribution  schedules.  This point is further  discussed  below.
12ax  =X,  aVX  =AI,x  =K,U  (11)
On the other  hand, the first-order  conditions  of the government's  optimization  problem imply:
Vp  (p -1)(p+A)  +  Qp =0  (12)
V. = (,8 -1)MAP+:)  =°12
Combining  (11) and (12), and recaUling  the definition  of the social  welfare  function  0 in (9), the solution
to the goverunent's optimization  problem  can be re-written  as:
a = pa KV  + pauvpu+(1-  _K_  au)  1=O V;  =0V  (13)
V,  =a  =plVK+  pau^U  + (1-all-aU)V,'=0
Therefore,  by valuing  the contributions  of interest  groups,  the government  inplicitly maximizes  a social
welfare  function  in which  different  individuals  ha-e different  weights  depending  on whether  they  belong
to one of these groups.  The more the govermnent  values the contributions  (i.e. the higher is the
parameter  B),  the greater is  the share  of interest  group  members  in this social  welfare  function. A similar
result is obtained  in Grossman  and Helpman  (1994) in the context  of pure trade policy, and it extends
naturally  to factor market  distortions.
We now discuss the nature and direction of the policy distortions  induced by the lobbying
activities. The issue is not obvious,  because  of second-best  arguments. With  two endogenous  distorting
policies,  it is not clear that welfare  improvements  would  be obtained  by moving  one instument in the
direction  of less intervention,  given  that the other  policy  distortion  remains  intact. In fact, this second-
13best argument  is shown  to be particularly  relevant  for the labor  market  distortion. To see this, rewrite
equation  (13)  as:
DP  =  A,V
(13')
Since O(p,w)  is the (utilitarian)  social welfare function,  equation (13') identifies  the direction of the
equilibrium  distortions. Quite intuitively,  the distortion  is proportional  to the welfare  effect  of the policy
on the unrepresented  group, the agricultural  sector.  The constant  of proportionality  depends  on how
much  the government  values  the contributions  by the active  lobbies. Combining  (IOA),  (1OK)  and  (IOU)
with (13), it is possible  to show  that in equilibrium  V A <  0.  Hence,  Qp  is negative  too, which  means
that  the equilibrium  tariff is too  high from  the social  welfare  viewpoint,  given  the equilibrium  wage  level.
Concerning  Ow,  it is necessary  to consider  whether  agricultural  workers  receive  a transfer  from
the government or not.  If they do not (OA =  0), then V  A =  0 (see (10A)), which implies Ow  =  0.
The wage gap w - 1 therefore  represents  the second-best  labor market  distortion,  given that tariffs are
positive.  This efficiency of the labor market distortion results from the fact that the wage level in
manufacturing  affects  only the individuals  who are represented  by interest  groups  and, hence, can do
something  about  it.  This is not so anymore  if tariff  revenues  are distributed  to all the population,  because
then  the welfare  of agricultural  workers  depends  on manufacturing  wages. Specifically,  if  A  > 0. then
VwA >  0, thus implying  Ow >  0.  In this case, although  the labor market is distorted, wages in
14manufacturing  are still  too  low. Given  the equilibrium  tariff,  more,  and  not less,  government  intervention
would  be desirable  in labor  markets. 6
Next,  we characterize  the  equilibrium  contributions.  Following  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994),
we only  consider  truwhfzd  contribution  schedules.  Only  these  contributions  support  "coalition  proof' Nash
equilibria,  and vice-versa  all such equilibria  are reflected  by truthful  contributions  (see Bernheim  and
Whinston,  1986).7 A truthful  contribution  schedule  has the forn:
X 1(p,w;z1 ) =MAx[O,  ca'V(p,w)  _zX]  ,  x =KU  (14)
where  zx is a scaler. Thus, a truthful  contribution  pays the govermnent  the true welfare  effect of the
policy, in excess  of a reservation  value zx.  By equation  (14), not only a truthful  contribution  function
is differentiable  (except  possibly  at 0), but its siape is entirely  determined  by the lobby  indirect  utility
function  c  V;' (p,w).
To complete  the characterization  of the equilibrium,  it remains  to determine  the equilibrium
reservation  utilities, zx, x  =  K. U.  These are pinned down by the requirement  that, given the
equilibrium  contribution  of the other  group,  each lobby  is paying  the lowest  possible  contribution  (i.e.,
is setting  the largest  zx)  to induce  the goverrment  to pursue  the equilibrium  policy  characterized  above.
For this to be the case, given the equilibrium  contribution  functions  XX(p, w; zXl),  x =  K, U, the
government  'must be indifferent  between implementing  the equilibrium  policy and receiving the
equilibriun  contribution  from both lobbies  on the one hand,  or taling a positive  contribution  from only
6  In  a more  general  model,  in which  agricultural  wages  would  be negatively  affected  by high  wages
in manufacturing,  the sectoral  wage differential  would  tend to be too high.  The sign of Ow
would  therefore  depend  on whether  the positive  effect  that  higher  manufcturing  wages  have on
tariff revenue  doninates  the negative  effect  they  have  on agricultural  wages.
A "coalition  proof' Nash  equilibrium  is stable  to non-binding  communication  among  the players.
15one of the  two lobbies, and implementing  the policy optimal for that lobby on the other hand.
Specifically,  let:
(pz,wz)  Amax[((p,w)+(f-1)aVX(p,w)  ,  x-K,U  (15)
be the policy  which is jointly optimal  for the government  and lobby  x.  With truthfiul  contributions,  this
is the optimal policy for the government, if  it  were to  take contributions  only from lobby x.
Furthermore,  let (pO,  w%)  be the equilibriun policy  characterized  by (13). That is:
(p%)  Arp=Argmax(p  (pw)+(-  1)[aKVK(p  w) + IUVU(pw)J)  (16)
Then, the indifference  condition  stated  above  can be written  as:
O(P%.w")  + (P - 1)[I(pOwO;zK)  + IU(pOwO;zU)]  (17)
= Q(p1
9w1) +(f_-1)A1 (p 3w';z')  ,  x=K,U
The left-band  side of (17) denotes  the equilibrium  government  payoffs;  the right-hand  side denotes  the
government  payoffs  when only  one interest  group provides  contributions.
Inserting the expression  for tuthful  contributions,  (14), in (17), and simplifying  yields the
equilibriun reservation  utilities  for both lobbies:
(fS  - 1)z1 = n (p%w)  + (  p-1)[  .KvK(  ,O)  + GUVUNpwO  ) ]i  (18)
- C(p T,wY)-(P-1)aYVY(p,w')  ,  x=K,U  ,  x*y
16The first two tenns on the right-hand  side of (18) are a measure  of the maximum  gross welfare  (i.e.
disregarding  the contributions)  attainable  by the govermnent  and the two  active  lobbies. The last two
tenns measure  the maximum  gross welfare attainable  by the smaller coalition  consisting  of the
government  plus  only  one lobby. Thus, the equilibrium  reservation  utilities  equal  the welfare  difference
between  the coalition  inclusive  of all the lobbies,  and the smaller  coalition  with only  one lobby.
The reservation  utility zx measures  the "rent"  that lobby  x can extract  from the agency  relation
with  the govemment.  The larger is zx, the larger is the benefit  resulting  from the policy  distortion  that
is appropriated  by the lobby  rather than  by the government.  The foregoing  discussion  illustrates  that  the
size of this rent for lobby  x depends  on how  well the government  can do with the other lobby  alone.
Thus,  the "economic  power' of a lobby  is not  absolute,  but it is relative  to that  of its competitors.  These
results  are further  discussed  in section  6 below  as well  as in Grossman  and Helpman  (1994). Finally,
comparing  equations  (15) and (16), we see that (18) implies  zX >  0, x = K, U: in equilibrium  both
lobbies  capture  some  rents from the agency  relation.
Repeating  the analysis  for Xx,  rather  than  zx, it is also possible  to show  that  Xx  (p0, w°; zx) >
0,  x  =  K, U,  i.e.  contributions  by  both lobbies are  strictly positive.  To  see this,  subtract
(OI3-)aXVV(pO,wO)  from both sides  of equation  (18), which  becomes:
- 1)[ uX'Vx(pO,wO)  -ZZ] = D(py,w7 ) + (p -1)aYV T(py,wy)  (18')
-Q(pO,wO)-(p-1)aYV7(pP,wO)  ,  x=K,U  ,
Equation  (15)  implies  that the right-hand  side  of (18  ') is strictly  positive. Therefore,  in equilibrium,  both
interest  groups  actively  lobby  the government  to influence  economic  policies.
175.  Comparative Statics
The model  presented  in the previous  sections  can be used to determine  the equilibrium  level of
trade barriers and sectoral  wage differentials,  as well as to analyze the relationship  between these
distortions  and the value of key parameters  of the economy. Equilibrium  product  and labor market
distortions  are the values  of (p -p*)/p  and (w  - 1)/w  which  simultaneously  solve  the first-order  conditions
of all the involved  economic  and  political  agents. We  assume  that the solution  to this problem  is feasible
in the sense that contributions  by each organized  group are not greater than the aggregate  income
available  to the group's  members.
By replacing  the Vi  by their analytical  expressions,  given by (IOA),  (1OK)  and (IOU),  and by
taking  (6) into account,  the first-order  conditions  of the goverunent's optimization  problem  become:
l[Y  +  (w -1)Lp]  + (p - A)Tp  - (P -A)C  =  (
P(w-l)L  . (U- A  e)T  =-o
where:
and Lp, Tp, Lw and  Tw are functions  of p and w (see footnote  4).  After  some  algebra,  this system  of
equations  can be re-written  as follows:
p -p_  A  I  Ay  iav
-~~~14  +  (  1eJ
pO  p_^4,  ep  C  (20)
w  P  p°
18where the superscript "0" reminds that this is the equilibrium, and where fp  =  - Cp p/C  >  0 is the price
elasticity  of domestic  demand  for manufactured  goods. Note  that the second  equation  in (20)  establishes
a relation  of complementarity  between  the distortions  in product  and labor  markets. Note also that  there
would  be no distortions  at all if B =  1, i.e. if the government  did not value contributions  by interest
groups.
More  generally,  the comparative  statics  properties  of  the model  can  be analyzed  by  solving  system
(20) on the distortions (p  - p*)/pQ and (w° - 1)/wO. The partial derivatives of these distortions with
respect  to the pararneters  in the model  are summarized  in Table  I for the case where  tariff revenues  are
distributed  evenly  to all the population  (0A =  1).  Results  in parenthesis  correspond  to the case  where
only the individuals  who  are organized  in interest groups  receive  transfers  from the government.  The
sign  of the partial  derivatives  in the table is always  the same  for both distortions,  which  highlights  once
more their complernentarity.
Product  and labor market  distortions  are higher:
The smaller is the price-elasticity  ep of domestic  demand for the good produced  by  the
nanufacturing  sector. A high  price elasticity  makes  it indeed  more  costly  for the government  to
introduce  policy  wedges  in this sector, because  consumption  distortions  become  significant.
*  The greater is the output  Y of the manufacturing  sector, relative  to domestic  consumption  C.  A
large output implies  that specific-factor  owners  have  much to gain from expanding  the sector.
A small consumption,  in tum, implies  that consumers  have relatively  little to lose.
*  The more concentrated  is capital ownership  across the population  (i.e. the smaller is aK).
Capital  owners  are also  consumers  and, as such,  they  suffer  from  market  distortions. The  bigger
their group, the more  they intemalize  the efficiency  loss resulting  from their lobbying.
*  The less  encompassing  is the labor  movement  (i.e. the smaller  is 0 aU).  The reasons  are the same
as for capital  owners.
19*  The greater  is the valuation  B  attached  by the govermnent  to contributions  by interest  groups.
Table 1
Comparative  Statics  for the Equilibrium  Distortions
K  U
Y/C  a  a  ,B
p
0  0
(p  p*)  /p  +  (0)  +
0  0
(w  D  1)w  +  (0)  +
The extent  of product  and labor  market  distortions  also depends  on whether  tariff revenues  are
distributed  to all the population  or only  to the individuals  who  are organized  in interest  groups. A simnple
way to see this is to replace the second equation in (20) into the first-order  condition  for profit
maximization  in (4), which  yields:
FL(K,L) =  1(21)
[1-p  1(1_a-_  OU)*h]p- +  _UK_  a-cU)e4pal
When  agricultural  workers  do not  benefit  from  government  transfers  (,A = 0), the above  equation  boils
down  to FL(K,L)  = lI/p*. In spite  of a strictly  positive  tariff, the sectoral  allocation  of labor  is optimal.
Only consumption  decisions are distorted by government policies.  When tariff revenues are distributed
to all the population,  in tun,  FL(K,L)  falls  short of l/p* and employment  in manufacturig is above  its
20optimal  level. However,  as long as Y/C < 1, the first equation  in (20) implies  that tariff barriers  are
lower  when  OA  > 0.  Redistribution  of tariff  revenues  to agricultural  workers  thus reduces  consumption
distortions,  while  aggravating  production  distortions.
The results  in Table 1 are very similar  to those  obtained  by Helpman  and Grossman  (1994)  for
the structure  of protection. As in their paper,  the equilibrium  level of market  distortions  combines  the
parameters  that  should  be considered  in a Ramsey  rule for optimal  taxation  (ep  and Y/C)  with those  that
specifically  correspond  to the common  agency  setting  (aK, (xU  and 0).
However,  by considering  capital  and  labor  as the  relevant  interest  groups,  our results  also  bridge
the gap with the vast literature  on the virtues  of corporatism. 8 If trade unions  are narrowly  defined,
their  members  benefit  form tariff  barriers  and wage  differentials,  while  imposing  only  a light  burden  on
each  individual  consumer.  As the number  of beneficiaries  from the distortions  increases,  the burden  gets
heavier,  thus  making  organized  workers  internalize  (as consumers)  part of the resulting  efficiency  loss.
In the limit, if all individuals  are represented  by either  a trade union  or a capital-owners  association,
which  is the proper form of corporatism,  then neither  product  nor labor  markets  are distorted. In this
case, the common  agency  model  yields efficient  outcomes. Hence, inefficiency  is due to incomplete
representation.
6.  Social Pact
A social  pact  can  be viewed  as a cartel  between  unionized  workers  and  capital  owners. The shift
from  non-cooperative  to cooperative  decision  malcing  by the  two interest  groups  modifies  the way  political
contributions  are chosen,  which in turn could  affect  the equilibrium  level  of product  and labor market
distortions.  But  this shift  can have  consequences  on employment  determination  too.  So far, it has been
8  See Bruno  and Sachs  (1985)  and Calmfors  and Driffill  (1988),  among  others.
21assumed  that firms  are on their labor demand  schedule. Each  of them unilaterally  determines  its level
of employment,  given  the level of prices and wages. Both  capital  owners  and unionized  workers  could
be better  off though,  if they  jointly decided  on employment.  This would  take them away  from the labor
demand  schedule,  to some  more efficient  contract  schedule  (McDonald  and Solow, 1981).
Consider  first the joint determination  of political  contributions  under the assumption  that firms
are on their labor  demand  schedule. This assumption  corresponds  to the case of a cartel which  is strong
enough  to set and monitor  political  contributions  by capital  owners,  but not to interfere  with their 'right
to manage"  the firms.  The cartel thus chooses the lobbying  activities  to maximize  the joint welfare
function  VS, defined  as:
VS(p,W) * aKVK(p w)  + aUVu(p,w)  - A(p,w)  (22)
where  X  is now the  joint contribution  o' the cartel  to the govemment. The government  is still described
as before; namely,  it maxiimizes  equation  (8), except  that  XK + XU  is now  replaced  by X. Employment
is also determined  like in the previous  model,  and there  are no side  payments  between  capital  owners  and
union members.  Thus each individual in the cartel pays a contribution equal to )U/(aK +tU).
The cartel's first-order  conditions  imply:
£KVK  +UUVU  =()
p  p  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(;23)
CILlC  + auvwu=I
while  the goverunent's first-order  conditions  are exacdy  as before. Combining  equations  (23) with the
goverunent's first-order  conditions,  it is easy to verify that the equilibrium  policy is identical  to that
described  in the previous  sections. The distortion  in the set up of the previous  sections  arises  from the
22fact  that one sector (agriculture)  is excluded  from the lobbying. The social  pact docs nothing  to remedy
that distortion.
There is a sense, howcver, in which the social pact could  be welfare improving. The cost of
influencing  the govermnent  could  be smaller  if capital  and labor  cooperate  with  each other. Without  the
social  pact, capital  and labor unilaterally  lobby  the govermnent  to tilt policy in their desired  direction.
To some  extent, therefore,  they also lobby  against  each other (particularly  in the case of the minimum
wage), and the government  free rides on that.  Cooperation  enables  them to pay the govenmnent  the
minimum  amount  needed  to get the policy  they want.
To formally address this issue, we need to characterize  the cartel contribution  schedule  in
equilibrium. Like in section  4, we only consider  truthful  contribution  schedules. Thus:
)S(p,w;z 8 ) - Max[O,  KVK(p,W)  + UUVU(p,w)  - z'S  (24)
where zS is the reservation  utility of the cartel.  With only one lobby, equilibrium  requires the
government  to be indifferent  between  taking  the equilibrium  contribution  and taking  no contribution  at
all and implementing  the optimal  policy of no intervention. Using the same notation as before, this
indifference  condition  can be stated  as:
aQ  VwA  + (p -l))lS(p 0,wzS) - Q('p,1) c o  (25)
where  the last term on the left-hand  side of (25) is aggregate  (and government)  welfare  at free trade and
no labor  market  intervention. Combining  equations  (24)  and (25), we obtain  the equilibrium  reservation
utility  of the cartel:
(, _ 1)zS = Q(p°,wO)  + (,B  -1)[  eKV  K(pO,wo)+  £UVU(pOwOO)]JQ(p-  1)  (6
23Recall  that  the social  pact  leads  to the same  equilibriun  policy  discussed  in the  previous  sections.
Hence,  the question  of whether  the social  pact reduces  the equilibrium  contributions  received  by the
government  amounts  to a comparison  of zS versus  zK + zU. By equations  (26)  and (18), equilibrium
contributions  are smaller  with  the social  pact  than in a decentralized  setting  if the  following  condition  is
satisfied:
S  [Q(pX,yjr)  + (P - )Ly  W] 
z"K,u  (27)
Q(p , 1) + Q(p°,w°)  + (3 - 1) aKVK(pO,wO)  + (P - 1)  UVU(pO,w°)
Applying  the same  arguments  of section  4, condition  (27) has a nice interpretation.  The left-krnid  side
of (27) is the maximum  welfare  attinble  by the two coalitions  consisting  of the govermnent  plus one
active lobby.  The right-hand  side is instead  the maximum  welfare  attainable  by the LV'. '  roalitions
consisting  of the government  plus  both lobbies  (i.e. the Nash  equilibrium)  and of the government  alone
(i.e., the free  trade and  no labor  intervention  outcome).  If the left-hand  side  is larger  than  the  right-hand
side, then in the Nash equilibrium  the government  can extract  more surplus,  because  it can credibly
threaten  to play one lobby  against  the other. It is precisely  in this case  that the social  pact pays, in the
sense  that  it reduces  the amount  of resources  wasted  in distributional  activities.
Condition  (27)  is more  likely  to be fulfilled  if the interests  of capital  and labor  diverge  from each
other. For in this case  (pK,wK)  and IU,wU) are very different,  and  the equilibrium  policy  (p0,wO)  is
more  likely  to be a compronise  that does  not please  either lobby  very much. This conflict  of interest
is present  in this model  with regard to the wage  policy, but not with regard to commercial  policy.
Hence,  in the absence  of specific  assumptions  on the functional  form of preferences  and technology,  we
24cannot  tell whether  (27) is satisfied. Despite  this ambiguity,  note, however,  that a necessary  condition
for a social  pact to emerge  is that it is a Pareto improvement  for the lobbies  involved. 9
Next we turn to the second  relevant  issue  in a social  pact. Cooperation  between  capital  owners
and  unionized  workers  may  lead  to their  joint deternination  of the employment  level. In this case,  there
is no need  for the cartel  to try to influence  minimum  wages. Indeed,  side payments  between  capital  and
labor  aTe  now  feasible  by assumption,  and  they  have  to be either  added  to or subtracted  from wages. If
an agreement  can be reached  on the level of net workers' compensation,  then the rationale  to spend
resources  in making  the government  set some  specific  minimum  wage  level  vanishes.
The cartel's objective  function  can thus  be re-written  as:
V5(p.L) =  VK(p,L) + OUVU(p,L)  (22')
where  L does  not  depend  on p and  w in the way  described  by the labor  demand  schedule  in (4) anymore.
The expected  income  of the cartel is:
aIK  + aUIU a pF(K,L)  + (au -L)  + ({K,K  + aUfU)T(p,L)  - l(p)  (7S)
where  the first term on the right-hand  side is the value of output  in the manufacturig sector, while  the
second  term is the labor  income  earned  by the fraction  of union  members  who  only find employment  in






9  Since  product  and labor  market  distortions  are not modified  by the pact, the improvement  can
only result  from a reduction  in their political  contributions.  This reduction  is thus a necessary
condition  of the social  pact.
25The  definition  of the net cartel  income  in (7S)  and that of tariff revenue  in (5) imply,  by the envelope
theorem:
V  G F(K,L)  +(MK+!  +  Ul,U)T  - (aK +  eU)C  (29)
VL*  PFL-1  + (ale  + CUOU)TL  (30)
with TL and Tp resulting  from equation  (5').  It follows  that the employment  level  associated  with a
given  domestic  price  p is such  that:
FL-  1  (31)
L  1-(1-UCj-UU)+A  P,  + (l-alC-aU)eP
When  agricultural  workers  do not  benefit  from  government  transfers  (4A = 0), then  FL = l/p*, so that
the sectoral  allocation  of labor  is still optimal.  Therefore,  the social  pact  does not modify  employment
in manufacturing.  But  this  is not  true anymore  if tariff  revenues  are  distributed  to all the  population  (OA
>  0).  In this case,  the comparisen  between  equations  (31)  and (21)  shows  that  for any  given  domestic
price p, employment  in manufacuring  will be higher  under  a social  pact than  in the Nash  equilibrium.
To analyze  the consequences  of the  social  pact  on  tariffs,  recall  that  the  government  optimization
problem  renains  the same  as in equation  (8),  except  that  political  contributions  X  depend  now  on p only.
Replacing  the govemment's  first-order  condition  into the third equation  in  (28), and taking  (5) into
account,  it can be shown  that  the rude  setting  the tariff  rate  is the same  as in the absence  of a social  pact
(first  equation  in (20)). But  the tariff  rate  itself  can  be different,  because  the rule involves  the ratio  Y/C,
which  in turn depends  on employment  in  n.  Specifically,  if agricultral workers  benfit
from  govermment  transfers  (5A > 0), then  employment  in manufacturng  is higher  under  a social  pact.
Por any given  domestic  price  p, the ratio  Y/C is higher  too, and  so is the equilibrium  protection  rate.
26To summarize,  a social  pact  will  modify  the extent  of product  and labor  market  distortions  if two
conditions  are met. First, the pact  has to include  employment  as one  of the variables  capital  owners  and
unionized  workers  negotiate  on. In terms  of the wage  bargaining  literature,  firms  have  to give  up their
"right  to manage". And  second,  the individuals  who  are not organized  in interest  groups  have  to benefit
from govermnent  transfers.  If these two conditions  are fulfilled,  the social pact will lead to larger
distortions  both in consumption  (higher  tariff rate) and in resource  allocation  (higher employment  in
manufacturing).  But except for this particular  case, the social  pact should  only affect the extent  of
political  contributions,  in the way  that was described  above.
7.  Reform Conditionality
The model  discussed  in the previous  sections  can be used  to analyze  the role of a foreign  agency,
such as a donor country, or a multi-lateral  organization  like the World Bank, in shaping  domestic
economic  policies. By making  aid or subsidized  loans  conditiornl  on economic  reforms,  this agency  can
be seen as an additional  principal  of the model competing  with capital  owners  and unionized  workers
in influencing  economic  policies. Assume  thaL  ihe  foreign  agency  is interested  in improving  the aggregate
welfare  of the recipient  country. The question  is: how should  conditionality  be designed  in order to
achieve  this goal?
The welfare  effects  of aid conditionality  depend  on the timing  of events, i.e., on whether  the
foreign  agency  pledges  its contribution  at the same  time as domestic  interest  groups,  or it rather commits
to a contribution  schedule,  leaving  room  to the interest  groups  to lobby  after  the irreversible  conditionality
rule is announced.  We consider  first the case  where  the foreign  agency  and  the domestic  interest  groups
simultaneously  choose their contribution  schedules. The structure  of the model  is thus the same as
before,  except  for the fact  there is now an additional  principal.
27Let B(p,w)  be the net transfer  by the foreign  agency. Conditionality  is reflected  in the fact  that
the transfer  depends  on the chosen  economic  policies,  p and w.  Although  this is not essential  to the
argument,  assume  the agency  manages  to get this transfer  directly  to the individuals,  hence by-passing
the government.  In this case, the govenfment's  objective  function  becomes:
V0(p,w)L(13-1)[V'(p.w)  +VU(p.w)] +* (p,w) +  B(p,w)  (8')
The objective  function  VF of the foreign  agency,  in turn, is given  by:
%F(P(p,w)  p,w) + (1 -B)B(p,w)  (32)
where  a  >  1 represents  the oportumnity  cost of the agency's  funds.  If e =  1, financing  the transfer
would  not  be a problem,  and  the agency  would  care  only  about  aggregate  welfare  in the recipient  country.
Since the foreign agency  and domestic  interest groups simultaneously  set their contribution
schedules,  the interest groups  take the net transfer  B as given.  Therefore,  their first-order  conditions
remain  the same as before (see equations  (11)). With regard to the foreign  agency, it maximnizes  its
objective  function  when:
BP=81  1P
(33)
B=  8-1  *w
Not surprisingly,  the slopes  of its contribution  schedule  with respect  to the economic  policy  argumen
p and w have  the same  signs  as the slopes  of the aggregate  welfare  function  0 with  respect  to these  two
arguments.
Finally,  the goverment's first-order  conditions  are:
28V 1?  =(p-1)(I'  +  Ap)  + QI.B  =0
(34)
After replacing  the first-order  conditions  for the foreign  agency  and the domestic  interest  groups, equation
(34) can be re-written as follows:
V0 =  A  VP + 0 aUVPU  + ( I _  lK  &U)VA  =  0
(35)
so=I rV'I  + A!  UUVU + (I  _  aLX  CU)VA  = O V'0=  A  (1  aUyA=
with:
aI l+  K(e -1) 
Therefore, reform conditionality  by the foreign agency has the effect of reducing the weight of the
individuals who are represented by interest groups in the social welfare function maximized by the
government. As the opportunity  cost e of the funds pledged by the agency decreases, this weight gets
closer to the one that would be used by a Pigouvian  policy maker.  In the limit, if e was equal to one,
then conditionality  would lead to first-best policies.
What does the analysis  suggest about  the optimal  design of conditionality? To answer, note first
of all that the similarity between equations  (35) and (13) also allows to derive the signs of Op  and OW
in equilibrium and, therefore, the nature of the reforms the foreign agency should help implementing
through conditionality.  The analysis  is identical  to that in section  4.  Equation  (13) in that section  showed
that equilibrium  protection  was too high (S  p <  0) irrepective of whether agricultual workers receive
transfers from the government  or not.  Equation (33), in turn, implies Bp <0,  which means that net
transfers by the foreign  agency should be conditional  on trade liberalization.
29This conclusion  does not  apply  to labor market  liberalization.  In the case  where  tariff revenues
are distributed  evenly  to all the population,  by (13') (kw < 0.  Taken  literally,  this result would  mean
that  the foreign  agency  should  push  for higher  (not lower)  wages  in the protected  sector  of the  economy.
In the more realistic  case  where  govemment  transfers  go only  to the individuals  who  are organized  in
interest  groups, Ow  = 0, which  implies  that transfers  by the foreign  agency  should  not be conditional
on labor market  policies. This result  follows  from the complementary  that was noted above,  between
product  and labor market  distortions. If the foreign  agency  succeeds  in inducing  the govermnent  to
reduce  tariffs, labor market policies  will automatically  be moved in the right direction by domestic
political  forces.
Consider  now the case where the foreign agency  commits  to a contribution  schedule,  and
afterwards  interest  groups  lobby  for government  intervention.  In this  case, each  of the groups  internalizes
the effects  of the transfer  by the foreign  agency  on the well  being  of its members. To take an example,
if the transfer  is conditional  on trade  liberalization,  by lobbying  for higher  tariffs an interest  group may
now  be raising  the income  its members  get as factor owners,  but at the same time it would  reduce  the
income  they  receive  from the foreign  agency.
The first-order  conditions  of interest  groups  now are:
C'Vx + a'B  = I"  ,  uXVZ+X=  ,  :x  =  K,U  (36)
Since  the first-order  conditions  for the foreign  agency  and for the government  are the same  as before
(equations  (33) and (34) respectively),  the equilibrium  is characterized  by the same  expressions  as (35)
above, but with the weight  of interest  group members  replaced  by B*,  with:
El  +  1  1)  )(a+U
30Thus, economic  policies get closer to the first best when the foreign agency commits to its optimal
conditionality  rule than when it tries to influence  government choices simultaneously  with domestic
interest groups. This is because a conditionality  clause  announced  well in advance  increases the cost of
large departures  from first-best  policies. As a result, the equilibrium  lobbying  is smaller, and so are the
resulting  equilibrium  distortions.
Finally, a conditionality  clause changes  slightly  the equilibrium  reservation  utilities, zK and zU.
Since  the logic  discussed  in section  4, however,  still applies, we do not derive once  more the equilibrium
contribution  functions  of the lobbies.
8.  Electoral  Competition
The previous model can also be extended to  include electoral competition  between different
parties.  In developing countries,  the political  system is often polarized  between  ideological  parties who
represent  the interests  of organized labor and capital owners. We will call them for simplicity (but with
inaccuracy)  left- and right-wing  parties.  The results of the previous section, on reform conditionality,
suggest a  natural question: can  a  conditional aid  program by  a  foreign agency have electoral
consequences? And if so, in what direction  and with what welfare effects? In this sub-section  we sketch
a simple extension  of the model that can address  these questions.
Consider  first a world without  any conditional  aid program. Suppose  that there are two possible
goverment types, left and right. The left-wing  government  maximizes  a social welfare function like (8)
above, except that welfare of union members receives a higher weight.  Similarly, the right-wing
government  assigns a higher weight to the welfare of capital owners.  Specifically, for the left-wing
government  the term 0 in equations  (8) and (9) is replaced  by:
DL(p,w)  gKVK(p,w)  + aUVU(p,w) +(j_  - £U)VA(p w)  (9')
31where aU> aU  , while  the right-wing  goverunent  has an analogous  welfare  function,  but with the
highest  weight  corresponding  to capital  owners.
Suppose  further  that  the tariff  revenue  only  goes  to unionized  workers  and  capital,  and not  to the
agricultural  sector. The results  in the  previous  sections  imply  that, from  the point  of view  of  maxinizing
the ideological  social  welfare  function  defined  in equation  (9'), the equilibrium  policy  with lobbying
always  involves  too much protection. They also imply  that the welfare  of agricultural  workers  is
unaffected  by the wage  policy.
Finally,  suppose  that the two government  types  run for office in an electoral  contest,  before
lobbying  takes  place  and  before  policy  is chosen.  All  capital  owners  vote  for the right-wing  government,
while  all unionized  workers  vote for the left-wing  government.  Assuming  that neither  union  members
nor capital  owners  reach  a majority  on their  own,  the election  outcome  is determined  by workers  in the
agricultural  sector. Voters' rationality  implies  that the agricultural  voter compares  the equilibrium
outcome  when  either  government  type is in office,  and votes  for the candidate  that yields  the higher
equilibrium  welfare. The welfare  of voters  in the  agricultural  sector  depends  on the policy  p chosen  by
the elected  government,  as well  as on other  political  dimensions  that  we do not attempt  to model. These
other dimensions  are captured  by the realization  of a random  variable,  g, distributed  in the population
of agricultural  workers  according  to the cumlative distribution  function  G(.).
Specifically,  agricultural  worker  i votes  for the left-wing  candidate  if:
VA(pa) +gi sVA(pL)  (38)
where pR and pL denote the protective  policy chosen by  the right- and left-wing  governments
respectively,  and  VA(p)  is  the welfare  of agricultural  workers  under  that  policy. The  variable  gi captures
the effect  of the other (non-modeled)  political  dimensions,  as perceived  by voter i.  Thus, if the two
32parties  choose  the same  equilibrium  policy  once  elected,  the right-wing  party  captures  the vote  of the i-th
agricultural  worker  if g' > 0 while  the left-wing  party  captures  it if g' < 0.
Under  this notation,  the left-wing  party wins  the election  if:
G[vA@L) VA(pKYI ~  it2  U  (39)
where  the left-hand  side  is  the fraction  of agricultural  workers  in favor  of  the left-wing  govement, given
the equilibrium  policy  of both types  of govermnent.
Next, consider  what  happens  itf before  the election  takes place, the country  is ficed with a
conditional  aid  program  by a foreign  agency. For simplicity,  let the  program  be conditional  on the tariff
policy  only.  The net transfer  is thus a lump sun  B(p) to each citizen,  conditional  on the policy  p
implemented  after  the election. This  has the effect  of altering  the agricultural  voters  preferences  for the
election  outcomes. The left-wing  party now  wins  the election  if:
GEVA  VL)p-V  ) + B(pL)-  B(pR)  U  (39')
As in equation  (39), the first term measures  the fraction  of agricultural  workers  in favor  of the
left-wing  govermnent. This fraction  is now affected  by the conditional  aid program, in two ways.
Directly,  as the transfer  B is larger with  the government  who  implements  the lower  tariff. This  effects
obviously  favors the morefree  rade party. And indirectly,  since  the conditional  aid progrm  presmbly
induces  both government  types  to choose  a different  policy  p than  they would  have  otherwise  chosen.
This second indirect  effect can go either way, and hvors the party who is more responsive to  the
conditional  aid program.
33Summarizing,  even if the policy is clhosen  after the elections, the presence of a conditional aid
program has a political effect, since its anticipation  by the voters can influence  the election outcome.
Typically, the aid is (and ought to be) conditional  on a low degree of protection.  In this case, and
abstracting  from the indirect effect mentioned  above, the aid program creates a bias in favor of parties
advocating  free trade (or, synnetrically,  a bias against parties advocating  high degrees of protection).
From the point of view of the foreign agency, this political effect is not undesirable, since it makes it
more likely  that trade liberalization  is implemented. Naturally, this conclusion  follows from a set up in
which protection  is the result of influence  activities, and is not chosen by a benevolent  social planner.
9.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper deals with the interaction of product and labor market distortions, and how to cope
with them, when govemments are responsive to pressures applied by interest groups.  Its two main
contributions  are in two areas.
At the analytical  level, the paper extends the connmon  agency model beyond the trade policy
issues considered  so far, to the analysis  of the simultaneous  determination  of product and labor market
interventions. The common agency model is a promising analytical  tool to analyze political influences
on policy fomfation.  This is beause  of its ability to derive endogenous  policies from first principles,
without  sacrificing  tractability  (Rodrik, 1994). By taking labor markets  and trade unions explicitly into
account, our paper brings the capital-labor  relationship  into the common agency  set up.  AldLough  more
traditional  than trade policy issues,  this relationship  has received  less attention  in the political economy
literature. By the same token, our paper provides a micro-foundation  for the discussion  on the virtues
of corporatism and the consequences  of social pacts.  More generally, it shows that the nature and
direction  of the labor market distortions  induced  by lobbying  activities  is not obvious, because of second-
best arguments.
34At the policy level, the main contribution  of the paper is the analysis  of the optimal  conditionality
clauses on product and  labor market reforms to  be  imbedded in  aid  programs by  multi-lateral
organizations  and donor countries. Policy lending has been at the core of the development  business  for
more than one decade.  Poor performance  is seen indeed as the outcome of "bad" economic policies,
including  binding  distortions in product and labor markets.  Bad policies, in turn, are explained  as the
result of "politics". Yet, there is no analytical  model to deal with optimal conditionality  when economic
policies are shaped by politics. The main result we obtain  here is that labor market distortions  ought not
to be targeted  because  they are likely to adjust  in the desired direction  once trade distortions  are removed
or diminished. This non-intuitive  result highlights  the risks of inferring  conditionality  rules from partial
equilibrium  analysis  when there are distortions  to two markets, and they are both endogenous.
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